A surprising connection on the professional network. A proposal of work from a headhunter, probably a young woman, operating from China. The opportunity to earn around £20,000 part-time writing a small number of geopolitical analyses for a Chinese company peppered with “non-public” or “insider” insights. Compensation in cryptocurrency or physical money favored.
It might appear obvious, on this telling, that something about this approach would be amiss. However, Beijing's influential Ministry of State Security still considers it valuable to use headhunters to attempt this – prompting the domestic spy agency to warn repeatedly about their operations online.
Large-Scale Approaches on Social Media
Last year, MI5 chief Ken McCallum said operatives from China were approaching Britons on LinkedIn on an unprecedented scale, at a rate of ten thousand over the preceding 30-month period, seeking governmental, industrial, military and technological classified information. But a fresh campaign targeting elected officials and Westminster has prompted the intelligence service to act again.
An espionage warning was distributed on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his Lords equivalent: a single slide after the repeated efforts of Shirly Shen and other operatives to reach out to MPs, lords, their assistants, economists, research organizations – anyone who might become a source.
Intelligence Strategy and Legislative Changes
In the typical style of British intelligence, there was no publication of the protective guidance from MI5 or the Home Office. Yet the service knew its briefing note would leak once it was sent electronically out to parliament. Sharing it in the press assists the wider public more easily recognize interactions with a fraudulent intent.
The alert has the effect of flushing out more information from within parliament, although that is not the agency's main objective. The agency wants public figures to recognize that just because interactions on professional networks are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are completely safe.
Additionally, the internal security service understood to have been responding to a particular event in the legislature, though the recent actions does come after the embarrassing failure of the prosecution of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his friend another person on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been charged of spying for the foreign power – a charge they denied – but failure to successfully conclude a prosecution under the now repealed Official Secrets Act resulted in warnings that British democracy had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Legislation and China's Long-Term Interests
Legislation has since been updated, and the security briefing includes a reminder of its replacement: “Individuals involved in espionage activity face significant legal consequences under the National Security Act.” It is a criminal offense if a person engages in conduct that is or is likely to “significantly help a overseas spy agency”.
An obvious question, though, is what China has to gain. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted access of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs less so. But the Chinese government is particularly focused in parliament: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the Britain's approach to China on matters such as Huawei or the Uyghur repression or genocide was being driven by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Ongoing Cyber Risks
To a degree there are cultural differences as well. Authoritarian governments like Beijing's utilize information gathering methods and the scale of its intelligence apparatus is vast, employing three hundred thousand individuals. A former US official, a US national cyber director under president Joe Biden, said it was occasionally assessed that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity engaged in this than Western agencies have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is willing to develop people over the extended period and sometimes even the intelligence services have found it difficult to distinguish between legitimate relationships and spying. “Beijing has a minimal requirement for what information is deemed to be of value,” security minister a government official told MPs on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the government situation may mean someone rapidly marginal turning significant.
An alternative perspective to consider the relentless activities at secret intelligence collection is in the broader framework of the international competition between China and the west at a threshold under the level of outright war. China has increased its cyber operations, with the Salt Typhoon infiltration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the another operation breach of countless internet devices.
Beijing is involved in persistent efforts to find secret informants on UK politics online because it wants to be challenging, to demonstrate influence and because it can.